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ECB’s Easing Package Is a Call for  
European Fiscal Reform by Shahin Vallée
Europe’s economic policy is currently being held hostage by incoherent decisions, which 
are not only crippling the euro area’s economy but also threatening global recovery. The 
ECB needs to admit that it cannot meet its mandate without fiscal support. In return, 
Germany needs to accept that true reform of Europe’s fiscal framework cannot take place 
without a real conversation about its debt brake policy, the schuldenbremse, and its 
balanced budget policy, the schwarze null.
On September 12, 2019, the ECB announced a new round 
of monetary easing in response to slower growth, low 
inflation, and a continuous decline in inflation expecta-
tions that had made the convergence of inflation towards 
the ECB’s target of 2 percent increasingly doubtful. This 
package, which combines a cut in the interest rate, the in-
troduction of a tiering system to reduce the burden of the 
low rate policy on banks, and the open-ended resumption 
of the asset purchasing program, is probably the ECB’s 
boldest package since its introduction of Quantitative 
Easing in 2015.
The key question, however, is whether this policy 
response can be effective in the current economic context. 
There is, in fact, a growing sentiment, including inside 
the ECB, that further monetary expansion without fis-
cal expansion will be ineffective. Worse, it may also be 
counterproductive. This happens when the “reversal rate” 
is reached – that is, the point beyond which monetary 
accommodation, all things being equal, becomes con-
tractionary. This notion rubs against orthodox monetary 
theory that considers inflation to always be a monetary 
phenomenon, which consequently means that monetary 
policy is always potent (albeit with declining returns). But 
this monetarist approach ignores the central role of the 
banking system in delivering monetary stimulus. Indeed, 
durably low or negative interest rates result in low profit-
ability for the banking system, which eventually hinders 
its ability to expand credit. Moreover, a flat or inverted 
yield curve clogs the fundamental workings of maturity 
transformation and destroys the banking system’s abil-
ity to turn short-term deposits into long-term loans. We 
are most probably already at the point where monetary 
accommodation becomes contractionary unless it is 
matched by appropriate fiscal expansion. 
This is why the growing tension on this issue inside the 
ECB should not be taken lightly. Indeed, unlike previous 
episodes of disagreement inside its governing council, the 
current dissent includes some who supported monetary 
expansion in the past, for example Banque de France Gov-
ernor Francois Villeroy De Galhau and French Executive 
Board Member Benoit Coeuré – neither of whom can still 
be suspected of courting the favors of conservative voices 
in Europe to increase their chances of taking the helm of 
the ECB. This uncertainty about the effectiveness of the 
package is also the reason why President Mario Draghi 
has argued very strongly for fiscal policy to “take charge.” 
However, public admission by the ECB that it cannot fulfil 
its objective without fiscal support remains taboo for two 
reasons. First of all, because it would reveal that the ECB 
cannot meet its mandate alone and undermine its cred-
ibility. Secondly, because it would potentially endanger 
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the ECB’s absolute independence and force greater fiscal 
and/or monetary cooperation than the ECB is prepared to 
accept.
Against this background, it is therefore critical to 
assess the extent to which the euro area’s fiscal stance is 
likely to move in response to the ECB’s package and plea. 
At the ECOFIN, an informal meeting of EU economic and 
financial affairs ministers, that took place in Helsinki on 
September 13–14, 2019, a discussion of possible reform of 
fiscal rules ended in a deadlock and none of the recom-
mendations of the European Fiscal Board were taken 
up. Despite the growing academic consensus about the 
inanity of the debt reduction rule introduced by the Fiscal 
Compact, the need to free fiscal rules from unreliable 
measurements of output gaps and structural deficits, and 
the need to introduce a golden rule encouraging a mini-
mum amount of public sector investments, finance minis-
ters are concerned that opening the Stability and Growth 
Pact to debate would lead to an unpredictable outcome 
that they cannot afford. In the absence of reform, the Eu-
ropean Commission will play a central role in interpreting 
the pact in the way that ensures the most accommodating 
stance. To start, it would need to stop considering the 
“stance broadly neutral and broadly appropriate” as it has 
done since 2016 because, without bolder steps, the Euro-
pean fiscal framework will gradually lose its relevance 
and coherence. The European economic governance 
framework will prove that it is unable to achieve the sort 
of fiscal coordination that is required to make a monetary 
union function effectively.
Germany has a particular responsibility in these dis-
cussions. Because it has consistently and loudly opposed 
monetary accommodation, Germany must make a clear 
proposal for an alternative. Such a proposal can only stem 
from a more open discussion about Germany’s own fiscal 
policy. First of all, Germany’s obsession across its political 
spectrum with the totem of the schwarze null needs to be 
challenged not only to address a strong cyclical downturn, 
but also to take advantage of borrowing conditions, the 
likes of which have never been seen before, to invest in its 
energy transition and infrastructure. Secondly, instead of 
obfuscating the debate on fiscal policy by hiding behind 
the German Constitution, political leaders should remind 
the public that, after three constitutional reforms in 2006, 
2009, and 2017, Germany’s fiscal federalism remains a 
patchy construction and a work in progress and that even 
the strict adherence to the schuldenbremse allows for con-
siderable fiscal expansion because of the excess surpluses 
that have accumulated in the control accounts since 2016 
at both the federal and länder (state) level.  
Starting this debate in Germany would, in turn, set the 
stage for a broader debate in Europe, in which the Euro-
pean Commission needs to concede that an appropriately 
expansionary fiscal stance cannot be achieved by the 
limited instruments of the EU budget, financial engineer-
ing by the European Investment Bank, or the current 
European fiscal framework. In the absence of progress on 
these fronts, the euro area’s economy will continue to suf-
focate and free-ride on the stimulus provided by external 
demand. This is not worthy of a European Union that 
prides itself on being a cooperative player in the world 
economy. The EU should not be surprised if the US and 
China respond to its inconsistent attitude with frustration 
and eventually with force – trade barriers, tariffs, cur-
rency intervention, or devaluation.
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